MATERIALISTS claim that in principle mentality could be accounted for entirely by properties of matter. They must, of course, clarify, as far as possible, the precise scope of the concept "properties of matter." According to materialists there exists only one type of "substance" in the universe, namely matter. Sophisticated experimental and theoretical analyses have led contemporary physicists to interpret known material entities as being composed of two classes of elementary particles, namely quarks and leptons and constituents of interaction fields that (...) mediate interactions between some or all of the elementary particles and which comprise photons, gluons, intermediate bosons and gravitons. For instance, protons and neutrons are composed--by hypothesis--of quarks, while electrons are probably the most familiar leptons. Whether any analyzed and postulated elementary particles and constituents of interaction fields are "ultimate" components of matter can never be known. It remains always possible that more basic subcomponents of known components will be discovered. This has happened repeatedly throughout the history of physics. Hence, what physicists understand by the "physical properties" of the basic components of matter must always remain expressed in terms of usually intricate hypothetico-deductive theories which are tentative and fallible. Contemporary relativistic quantum mechanics of elementary particles and of interaction fields provide typical examples of such hypothetico-deductive theories relating to present known basic components of matter. (shrink)

SummaryExtremism in the environment‐versus innateness controversy in the behavioural sciences and in human sociobiology is being examined. Genetic effects can be severely modified or overruled by environmental factors, but may, nevertheless, be important. Dawkins' view that we are survival machines programmed to subserve selfish genes seems untenable and is a root of racialism. It is also argued that morality is compatible with mixed genetic and environmental control of brains via existing biological machinery.

Human dignity has long been used as a foundational principle in policy documents and ethical guidelines intended to govern various forms of biomedical research. Despite the vast amount of literature concerning human dignity and embryonic tissues, the majority of biomedical research uses non-embryonic human tissue. Therefore, this contribution addresses a notable lacuna in the literature: the relationship, if any, between human dignity and human tissue. This paper first elaborates a multidimensional understanding of human dignity that overcomes many of the shortcomings (...) associated with the use of human dignity in other ethical debates. Second, it discusses the relationship between such an understanding of human dignity and ‘non-embryonic’ human tissue. Finally, it considers the implications of this relationship for biomedical research and practice involving human tissue. The contribution demonstrates that while human tissue cannot be said to have human dignity, human dignity is nevertheless implicated by human tissue, making what is done with human tissue and how it is done worthy of moral consideration. (shrink)

We comment on the previous paper by L. Basano. In particular, we show that its Section 2 is kinematically incorrect (the dynamics of a two-body interaction through tachyon exchange, incidentally, has already been thoroughly expounded in one paper of ours). Its Section 1 is simply a rather subjective introduction. As to its Section 3, containing indeed interesting problems, we again briefly refer to our earlier work. Our conclusions are still in favor of “au revoir to tachyons!,” even if it is (...) known that inside our cosmos tachyons are more likely to have a role in physics (e.g., in elementary particle and black-hole physics) as “exchanged objects” rather than as “asymptotically free” objects. (shrink)

Physicalists motivate their position by posing a problem for the opposition: given the causal completeness of physics and the impact of the mental (or, more broadly, the seemingly nonphysical) on the physical, antiphysicalism implies that causal overdetermination is rampant. This argument is, however, equivocal in its use of 'physical'. As Scott Sturgeon has recently argued, if 'physical' means that which is the object of physical theory, completeness is plausible, but the further claim that the mental has a causal impact on (...) the physical is no longer so evident. In this paper I assess the damage due to the ambiguity of 'physical' and provide a repair to the overdetermination strategy. (shrink)

The Four-Colour Theorem (4CT) proof, presented to the mathematical community in a pair of papers by Appel and Haken in the late 1970's, provoked a series of philosophical debates. Many conceptual points of these disputes still require some elucidation. After a brief presentation of the main ideas of Appel and Haken’s procedure for the proof and a reconstruction of Thomas Tymoczko’s argument for the novelty of 4CT’s proof, we shall formulate some questions regarding the connections between the points raised by (...) Tymoczko and some Wittgensteinian topics in the philosophy of mathematics such as the importance of the surveyability as a criterion for distinguishing mathematical proofs from empirical experiments. Our aim is to show that the “characteristic Wittgensteinian invention” (Mühlhölzer 2006) – the strong distinction between proofs and experiments – can shed some light in the conceptual confusions surrounding the Four-Colour Theorem. (shrink)

The general concept of a causal system has been basic in scientific thought. It may be formulated as follows. The system in question possesses certain measurable attributes such as those of dimensions, temperature, and so forth. In the case of a causal system, it is affirmed that the subsequent development of the system from a known initial condition—that is, a condition in which the measurable variables have known values—is uniquely determined by these values. More definitely, the value of these same (...) variables after any interval of time depends only on the initial values of the variables and the time interval which has elapsed. (shrink)

At Phaedo 59b Echecrates asks Phaedo who was present on the day when Socrates drank the hemlock in prison. Various Athenians are named , then various foreigners , but when Echecrates subsequently asks if two other foreigners, Aristippus and Cleombrotus, were present, Phaedo replies that they were said to be in Aegina . After this fleeting reference to Cleombrotus, Plato does not mention him again in the Phaedo or any other dialogue; and yet in later antiquity a certain Cleombrotus of (...) Ambracia rose to fame in connection with the Phaedo. Callimachus is our earliest source for the anecdote which immortalized the Ambracian : Επας ‘Ἥλιε αρε’ Κλεμβρτος μβρακιτης λατ' φ' Ψηλο τεεος ες δην, ζιον οδν δν θαντου κακν, λλ Πλτωνος ν τ περ Ψυς γρμμ' ναλεζμενος. (shrink)

In my view, Soviet philosophy must be judged not by the number of books and articles written, but by the works that won recognition in the professional milieu both in our country and, of course, abroad. There are such works and, furthermore, they are found in various areas of philosophical knowledge: the history of philosophy, social philosophy, esthetics, ethics, religious studies, logic, the methodology of scientific knowledge, and so on. Of course, one can accuse philosophers for writing during the years (...) of the existence of the Soviet Union many fewer good works than weak or mediocre ones, but this applies no more to philosophy than to science, art, or any other sphere of human activity. (shrink)